I. Introduction
F or many centuries the annistice agreement has been the method most frequently employed to bring about a cessation of hostilities in international conflict, particularly where the opposing belligerents have reached what might be termed a stalemate. This practice has not only continued but has probably increased, during the present century.
The first World War ended in an extended series of so-called annistice agreements.! During the twenty-one years which elapsed before the outbreak of the second World War there were really only two such agreements of any historical importance: that entered into in Shanghai on May 5, 1932 , which brought about a cessation of hostilities in the Sino-Japanese conflict of that period? and that entered into at Buenos Aires onJune 12, 1935 , which ended hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Gran Chaco. 3 The second World War also ended in an extended series of so-called annistice agreements; 4 and in the comparatively short period of time since then, there have already been no less than ten major general annistice agreements concluded by belligerents. 5 This increased importance in modem practice of the general annistice as an instrument leading to the restoration of peace has resulted in it having been likened to the preliminaries of peace 6 (which it has, in fact, practically superseded), and even to a definitive treaty of peace? Under the circumstances, it appears appropriate to review the history and development of the general armistice as a major international convention concerned with the non-hostile relations of belligerents, as well as to detennine its present status under international law.
8

II. General Discussion
What is the nature of a general annistice agreement, the war convention which has properly been termed "the most important and most frequently reached agreement between belligerents,,?9 A general annistice is an agreement 2 Levie on the Law of War between belligerents which results in a complete cessation of all hostilities for a specified period of time, usually of some considerable duration, or for an indeterminate period. It applies to all of the forces of the opposing belligerents, wherever they may be located. It may have a political and economic, as well as mili · h 10 a tary, c aracter. This definition, while adequate to describe the nature of a general armistice, necessarily omits many peripheral but nevertheless important facets of the term defined, facets which it is essential should be borne in mind in any searching analysis of the problem. What is the legal basis of the general armistice? How does it come into being? Does it create a new juridical status between the belligerents? These are but a few of the more important of the many questions relating to this problem.
As has already been noted, the armistice is a war convention. By definition a convention is an agreement; it is a contract; it is consensual. That this is all true of an armistice is fully established by reference to numerous international .
mili·
al 12 d h f f· . all 13 conventtons, tary manu s, an aut ors 0 texts 0 mternatlon aw. Belligerents are free to enter into an armistice or to decline to do so. They are free to include in an armistice any provisions which they may desire, unfettered by either legal restrictions or precedents, guided only by the necessities of war. 14 As one author has apdy stated:
The contractual field for an annistice is completely open. Here again" contracts take the place oflaw as between those who enter into them.,, 15 It follows that there is no fixed rule or custom which prescribes what provisions should or should not be included in an armistice agreement. 16 On the other hand, there are certain provisions which, as will be seen, are very generally included by the parties, not because of any legal compulsion, but rather because experience has proven that such provisions are of a nature to facilitate the purpose of the armistice and to insure against violations thereo£ 17 And whether the parties specifically provide therefor or not, an armistice does result in a complete cessation of active hostilities; that is, it results in a cease_fire. 1S Without a cease-fire there would, by definition, be no armistice. Being a contract, it must be negotiated. Because a general armistice results in a cessation of all hostilities, and because it may contain political and economic as well as military provisions, it has political significance. It may, therefore, be made only on behalf of the sovereignty of the state. 19 This sovereignty may be expressed by either of two methods: first, the armistice may contain a specific provision that it is to become effective only after ratification?O or second, the representatives of the state designated to negotiate the armistice, and they may be military or civilian or both, may be provided with full powers?l Modern
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practice appears to prefer the latter method. There were no ratifications of the so-called Armistice Agreements reached during either World War I or World War rr. 22 All of the armistice agreements reached under the aegis of the United Nations have been negotiated by representatives with full powers. None has . d ·fi . 23 reqUIre ratl catlon.
While it cannot be disputed that a state has complete freedom in determining who will represent it in negotiating an armistice, there have been conflicting expressions of opinion as to the advisability of the selection of military personnel for this purpose. Gentili did not believe that the task of negotiating an armistice should be delegated to the military. He said: "Therefore the leaders in war should handle matters which belong to war and not other matters.,,24 On the other hand, one modem writer states that "it is clear that, once the decision is made, the actual negotiations should be conducted by the military organs.,,25
It cannot be said that there is any established modem practice in this regard. The Renville Truce Agreement (Netherlands-Indonesia) and the India-Pakistan Cease-fire Order and Truce Agreement were both negotiated by diplomatic representatives. The four Israeli-Arab Armistice Agreements were negotiated by the military on behalf of each of the Arab countries and by mixed civilian-military delegations on behalf of Israel. The Korean Armistice Agreement was negotiated and signed exclusively by the military on both sides. And the three Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina were negotiated by both military and diplomatic representatives. 26 As a matter offact, with modem methods of communication, the question is no longer of very great importance inasmuch as the decision of the negotiator, whether he be military or civilian, will actually be made in each instance pursuant to instructions received direcdy from his home capital?7 Perhaps the best solution would be a "mixed team" consisting of members drawn both from the military and from the diplomatic corps, the practice followed by Israel in its negotiations with the Arab states, and by both sides in the Indo-Chinese negotiations.
A matter of major legal interest is that of the juridical status which exists during the period while an armistice is in effect. Is it war, or peace, or some third status? While there has, on occasion, been some rather loose language used with regard to this question, it may be stated as a positive rule that an armistice does not terminate the state of war existing between the belligerents, either de jure or de facto, and that the state of war continues to exist and to control the actions of neutrals as well as belligerents. 28
As long ago as the days when Greece and Rome were at the zenith of their power, it became accepted law that, although the indutiae (armistice or truce) resulted in a cessation of hostilities, it did not, as did the Joedus (treaty of peace), result in a termination of the war. 29 The early writers on international law concurred in this conclusion.
3D The great majority of contemporary writers 4 Levie on the Law of War likewise do so?1 Both the American and the British military manuals have unifonnly taken the position that an armistice is merely a cessation of active hostilities and is not to be described as either a temporary or a partial peace. 32
The rule stated above has received affirmative judicial approval on a number of occasions. Thus, the United States Supreme Court, confronted with the question of whether the 1918 Armistice had brought about a state of peace, ruled that "complete peace, in a legal sense, had not come to pass by the effect of the Armistice and the cessation of hostilities. ,,33 Similarly, on November 3, 1944, the French Court of Cassation stated that "an armistice convention concluded between two belligerents constitutes only a provisional suspension of hostilities, and cannot itself put an end to the state of war. "34 A few years ago an incident occurred in the Security Council of the United Nations which has been misconstrued as indicating a rule contrary to that discussed immediately above. Subsequent to the execution of the Israeli-Egyptian General Armistice Agreement, Egypt continued to maintain its "blockade" of the Suez Canal insofar as Israel was concerned. Israel complained to the Security Council asserting that the four armistice agreements had, in effect, terminated the state of war between all of the belligerent parties. Egypt, on the other hand, contended that the state of war continued despite the armistice agreements and that the blockade was legal. The Security Council on September 1, 1951, passed a resolution calling upon Egypt to lift its blockage. 35
This action of the Security Council has been construed as indicating that a general armistice is a kind of de facto termination of war. 36 It is considered more likely that the Security Council's action was based upon a desire to bring to an end a situation fraught with potential danger to peace than that it was attempting to change a long established rule of international law. By now it has surely become fairly obvious that the Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements did not create even a de facto termination of the war between those states. 37
One of the most frequent problems to arise with regard to the interpretation of a general armistice has been the determination of those acts which are permitted and those which are prohibited. There have been two very definite schools of thought on this problem. One school, long designated as the one with the weight of authority behind it, takes the position that during a general armistice a belligerent cannot legally do anything which the enemy would have wanted to and could have prevented him from doing but for the armistice. 38
The other school, long designated as the one with the weight of reasoning as well as the weight of practice behind it, takes the position that during a general armistice the belligerents must refrain from doing only those acts which are expressly prohibited by it. 39 This di~ute is apparendy as old as history,40 and is now of historical significance only. 1 Modem discussions of the subject point out the problem of enforcement and the invitation to charge and countercharge
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inherent in what might be tenned the classical approach. 42 In recent years the belligerents have been prone to spell out with particularity all those specific acts which are to be renounced during a general armistice. 43 Whether or not this is more conducive to an atmosphere which will lead to a restoration of peace is probably debatable, with strong arguments to be made on either side. Nevertheless, the modem rule appears to be that belligerents may be presumed to have the right to do anything which is not specifically forbidden by the tenns of the armistice agreement; and, conversely, that the doing of an act not specifically prohibited, even though the other side could have prevented it but for the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, cannot validly be made the basis for a complaint of violation or for the denunciation of the armistice.
III. Provisions of Armistice Agreements
Mention has already been made of the fact that the modem general armistice may, and frequently does, contain military, political, and economic provisions. 44 An analysis of the various provisions of a number of general armistice agreements, using as models not only the post-World War II agreements of this category, but also a number of older ones, will disclose the direction which the armistice is taking in the dynamics of international law, and will permit the drawing of . l ' 45 certam conc USlons. Incorporated within the hundreds of armistice agreements which have been concluded over the course of centuries it is possible to discover provisions covering almost every conceivable topic. Many such provisions are probably no longer relevant under conditions of modem warfare; and many were apt only because of the situation pertaining to a particular conflict. With the foregoing, which are interesting for historical reasons but which have no particular present legal significance, it is not necessary to concern onesel£ The present-day student of this problem will be concerned exclusively with the provisions which belligerents have, either consistently over the centuries, or atleast in recent times, believed it appropriate to incorporate in armistice agreements concluded by them.
In general, what matters should one expect to find included in a typical armistice agreement? Probably the most thorough and up-to-date answer to that question is contained in The LAw of LAnd Warfare, the new Manual of the United States Anny.46 Summarized, the provisions suggested therein relate to:
(1) Effective date and time; (2) Any discussion of the contents of an annistice agreement must logically begin with a discussion of the suspension of hostilities. That subject disposed of, one may tum to those of the above-enumerated items which are of some particular current interest.
A. Suspension of Hostilities
As has already been remarked, an annisticel,er se, with or without a specific provision, results in a cessation ofhostilities. 4 Nevertheless, only on very rare occasions have the parties failed to include such a provision. The Truce ofRatisbonne, signed on August 15, 1684, on behalf of Leopold, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and Louis XIV, King of France, did not specifically suspend hostilities. It contained a provision establishing a truce for twenty years from the date of ratification. 48 For whatever significance it may have, it should be noted that we find the same parties entering into the Truce ofVigevano on October 7, 1696, only twelve years later, and this time with a specific provision for a suspension of hostilities. 49 In April, 1814, Napoleon abdicated as Emperor and an annistice was entered into between the Allies and the French. While the brother of Louis XVIII had come to France as the representative of the King, there was considerable question as to the extent of control which he would be able to exercise over Napoleon's Grand Army. Accordingly, the annistice provided for a suspension of hostilities but only if "the commanding officers of the French annies and fortified places shall have signified to the allied troops opposed to them that they have recognized the authority of the Lieutenant General of the Kingdom ofFrance.,,50 Although a somewhat similarly confused political situation existed in Italy in 1943, it was apparendy considered unnecessary to include such a provision in the Annistice Agreement of September 3, 1943 , between the United Nations forces and the government of Marshal Badoglio which had succeeded Mussolini. 51 The Annistice Protocol signed by the Russians and the Japanese at Portsmouth on September 1, 1905, contained a clause prohibiting bombardment of enemy territory by naval forces, but no other provision with regard to the suspension of hostilities. 52 It directed the two governments to order their military commanders to put the Protocol into effect. On September 13 an agreement was reached by the army commanders in Manchuria which specifically provided for the suspension of hostilities effective on September 16 . 53
On September 18, a "Naval Protocol of Annistice" was signed by the navy commanders which, while it established a boundary line between the two fleets,
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again did not specifically suspend hostilities. 54 And the two anny commanders in Korea were unable to reach an agreement prior to the exchange of ratifications of the peace treaty on September 25. 55 On a number of occasions the United Nations has adopted, apparently without any reason therefor, terminology new to international law in its actions relating to armistice agreements. The Renville Truce Agreement uses the novel tenn "stand-fast and cease-fire.,,56 The India-Pakistan Agreement provides for a "cease_fire.,,57 The Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements adopt the procedure of omitting a specific provision for a suspension of hostilities-perhaps on the theory that this was unnecessary in view of the "truce" which had previously been imposed on the belligerents by the United Nations-and merely established "a general armistice between the anned forces of the two Parties.,, 58 The Korean Armistice Agreement reverted to standard procedure, providing for "a complete cessation of all hostilities" in Korea. 59
B. Effective Date and Time
It has been stated that in armistices time is of the first consideration. The time of conunencement and the moment of termination should be fixed beyond all possibility of .
. 60
nusconcepoon.
In the event that the armistice fails to specify an effective date and time, it is assumed that it is intended to become effective immediately upon signing. 61
Because of difficulties in assuring the receipt of proper notification by all commands, or for other reasons, it has, on occasion, been deemed advisable to have the armistice become effective on a later date. 62 For the same reason, the suspension of hostilities has on occasion been made effective at different times in different areas. 63 In view of the nature of the elaborate communications systems with which the modem anny is usually equipped, neither of these situations should any longer occur. The United States has been involved in at least one controversy with regard to the effective date of an armistice. The Protocol of Washington (United States-Spain), which was signed on August 12, 1898, provided that upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of the military and naval forces. 64 
Levie on the Law of War
The effective date of the suspension of hostilities was obviously not stated with sufficient precision. Spain later contended that the protocol had been effective from the date of signature. The United States took the position that this would render meaningless the latter part of the provision and that the suspension of hostilities had become effective only upon receipt of notification by the military and naval commanders in the field. More care in the drafting of the provision would have obviated this dispute, which involved the capitulation of Manila.
The importance of clearly indicating the effective date and time of an armistice agreement appears to be a lesson well learned, for we find that the subject is fully covered in all of the post-World War II armistice agreements.
65 Continued adherence to this practice will be at least a small step in minimizing the difficulties between belligerents which inevitably arise during any armistice.
c. Duration
Two types of provision with regard to duration are found in armistice agreements. Some specify a definite period. Thus, the Armistice ofNikolsburg and that of Shimonoseki provided for durations of four weeks and twenty-one days, respectively.66 The Armistice ofMalmoe, concluded by the King of Prussia and the King of Denmark on August 26, 1848, provided for an armistice of seven months with automatic prolongation unless one month's advance notice was given by either party.67 And the agreement reached by the French and the Austrians in Vienna on July 13, 1809, provided for an armistice of one month, but with fifteen days advance notice of resumption of hostilities. 68 Others provide for an indefinite duration or contain no provision whatsoever on this subject. Where this is the situation, the armistice remains effective until due notice of denunciation has been given by one of the belligerent parties.
It has been said that "it is customary to sti~ulate with exactness the period of time during which hostilities are suspended." 9 Although, prior to the twentieth century, armistice agreements, more frequendy than not, specified an exact duration, modem practice seems to be otherwise. No duration is specified in any of the major armistice agreements concluded since World War II. Thus, for example, the Renville Truce Agreement provides that it shall be considered binding unless, in effect, one party terminates it because of violations by the other party?O The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement provides that it "shall remain in effect until a peaceful setdement between the Parties is achieved.,, 71 The Korean Armistice Agreement provides that it shall remain in effect until superseded by "an appropriate agreement for a peaceful setdement at a political level between both sides."n Of course it may be argued that these two latter agreements are determinate, inasmuch as they remain in effect until an event certain. Perhaps so, but it can scarcely be said that there has been any Armistice Agreement 9 stipulation with exactness as to the duration of the annistice under these circumstances. The Israeli-Lebanese General Annistice Agreement is seven years old and no "peaceful setdement" is in sight. And while the Korean Annistice Agreement is only three years old, the "peaceful setdement" mentioned therein looks equally remote.
It has been stated above that where an annistice is ofindetenninate duration, it remains effective until "due notice" of denunciation has been given. Sometimes an annistice specifies the period of advance notice of denunciation which is required. Thus, the second Thessaly Annistice entered into by the Greeks and the Turks on June 3, 1897, provided for 24 hours' notice of resumption ofhostilities?3 More often, it does not. Article 47 of the Declaration of Brussels admonished that "proper warning be given to the enemy, in accordance with the conditions of the annistice,,?4 and Article 36 of both of the Hague Regulations (1899 and 1907) said approximately the same thing?5 The practical value of these provisions is dubious?6 It is precisely when there is no relevant condition in the annistice agreement that resort must be had to general international law. In this instance, conventional international law being lacking, resort must be had to custom-and custom says that ''fOOd faith requires that notice be given of the intention to resume hostilities.,, 7 A number of authors have commented on Sherman's ire when the armistice which he had concluded with Johnston on April 18, 1865, was disapproved by President Johnson and Secretary Stanton, and upon his honor and fairness in giving 48 hours' notice of resumption of hostilities to General J ohnston?8 Of his ire there can be no doubt.
79 Without attempting to detract from General Sherman's honor and sense of fairness, it is necessary to point out that the annistice itself provided for 48 hours' notice of resumption of hostilities. 80 Actually, Sherman even referred to this provision of the annistice agreement in ., h . h' h' . d 81 gIvmg t e notlce w IC It reqUlre .
D. Demarcation Line and Neutral Zone
A demarcation line between the two belligerent forces, frequendy accompanied by a neutral zone, has long been a technique employed for the purpose of preventing incidents which, even though inadvertent, might lead to a resumption of hostilities. 82 The statement that a "neutral zone is actually the only means there is of preventing violations of the annistice,,83 is probably too strong and tends to overevaluate the neutral zone. A neutral zone is unquestionably a very great aid in preventing incidents. However, it is definitely not a cure-all.
The last century provides a number of historical examples of the use of the demarcation line and the neutral zone in armistice agreements. In the Annistice of Cintra (France-Allies) provision was made for the River Siandre to be the line of demarcation between the two armies with Torres Vidras as "no man's land.,,84 The French-Austrian Armistice of Vienna of 1809 plotted a line of demarcation from point to point, but did not provide for a neutral zone. 85 The Armistice ofNikolsburg required the Austrians to remain 2~ miles from a line of demarcation which had been previously established, thus creating a neutral zone entirely at the expense of the Austrians. 86 And in the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 both the Armistice ofEpirus and that ofThessaly provided for lines of d . 87 emarcatIon.
The post-World War II armistice agreements have, in the main, followed the long established tradition. The Renville Truce Agreement provided for both a line of demarcation and a demilitarized zone. Like so many other novelties in this document, the line of demarcation was designated "the status quo line"-a term unique to this agreement!88 The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement created a demarcation line and provided that only defensive forces would be permitted "in the region" of the line.
89 This rather unusual arrangement was probably due to the fact that the demarcation line was the international boundary line between Lebanon and Palestine. The Korean Armistice Agreement contains a rather elaborate series of provisions establishing and regulating both a "Military Demarcation Line" and a "Demilitarized Zone.,, 90 The same may be said of the agreements entered into at Geneva on July 20, 1954 , between representatives of the Commanders-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina and of the People's Army ofViet-Nam. 91 It will be noted that the foregoing enumeration does not include the India-Pakistan Resolution for a Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement. In that agreement it was not necessary to create a demarcation line or a neutral zone, inasmuch as Pakistan agreed to withdraw her forces from the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.92
E. Relations with Inhabitants
A number of different problems arise during an armistice with regard to the relations between the belligerents and the local inhabitants. These problems include the movement of civilians from the territory controlled by one belligerent to that controlled by the other, commercial intercourse between the two territories, etc. However, as will be seen, these problems are all interrelated.
Article 50 of the Declaration of Brussels merely stated that it was within the power of the two belligerents "to define in the clauses of the armistice the relations which shall exist between the populations.,,93 Article 39 of both of the Hague Regulations purported to extend the contractual freedom of the parties
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by specifically including therein "what communications may be held in the theatre of war with the inhabitants and between the inhabitants of one belligerent State and those of the other.,,94 Neither of the foregoing provisions included Lieber's corollary to the effect that "if nothing is stipulated the intercourse remains suspended, as during actual hostilities.,,95 Both the Rules of Land Warfare and The Law of Land Warfare elaborate somewhat on Lieber, pointing out the necessity for a specific provision in the armistice, and then stating:
Otherwise these relations remain unchanged, each belligerent continuing to exercise the same rights as before, including the right to prevent or control all intercourse between the inhabitants within his lines and persons within the enemy lines.
96
It is probably also appropriate to point out here that Article 134 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, directs the belligerents, upon the close of hostilities, "to ensure the return of all internees to their last place of residence, or to facilitate their repatriation. ,, 97 From the foregoing it is clear that the official point of view is that the parties may include provisions concerning civilians in the armistice agreement, but that, failing such provisions, the condition of civilians remains unchanged from that existing during hostilities. The writers of texts on the subject are not quite so unanimous. The majority concur with the doctrines set forth above. 98 At least one author believes that "liberty of movement [for the civilian population] is presumed if the armistice is general and is concluded for a sufficiendy long period of time.,, 99 No justification has been found for that statement. Another states that it may be desirable to provide in the armistice for the relaxation of the prohibitions imposed on civilians-but he does not even hint that there is any . . h b f · f i .. 100 presumpllon In tea sence 0 spec! c provlSlon.
What has been the actual practice in this regard? Probably the most unusual suggestion was that made to the Estates General in 1608 by the French and British Ambassadors when they were attempting to use their good offices to terminate the hostilities in which the United Provinces were then engaged with Spain. They proposed armistice provisions which would not only have permitted commerce and communications between the territories controlled by the two belligerents, but also included what could only be characterized as a most-favored-nation clause!101 This proposal, perhaps understandably, was not included in the Truce of Antwerp, which was eventually reached by the parties in 1609. 102
The Armistice ofUlm, which was concluded on March 14, 1647, between Louis XIV and his allies on one side and the Elector Maximilian and his allies on the other side, authorized a complete resumption of commerce between the citizens of the two sides except for certain specified items such as saltpeter, powder, arms, etc.
103 The Truce of Ratisbonne also reestablished commerce between the two belligerents. 104 Then, two and a half-centuries later, we find a somewhat similar provision in the Renville Truce Agreement, where Article 6 specifies that "trade and intercourse between all areas should be permitted as far as possible.,,10S While the Korean Armistice Agreement contains no provision with regard to commercial intercourse, it does contain elaborate provisions for the movement of civilians who were in territory controlled by one belligerent and who were normally resident in territory controlled by the other. 106 The Vietnamese Agreement went even a step further, permitting any civilian to cross over to the territory controlled by the other belligerent ifhe desired to go there to live, the only restriction being that the move had to be made during the period allocated for troop withdrawals.
107 The latter Agreement also provides for the "liberation and repatriation" of all civilian internees held by either side. 1 08 This bears some resemblance to the provision of the Geneva Civilian Convention to which reference has already been made. 109
F. Prisoners of War
The problem of prisoners of war has received extremely varied treatment in armistice agreements over the centuries and still remains one which can be most difficult of solution.
The Armistice ofUlm provided for the release of all prisoners of war by both sides without the payment of ransom, this last proviso probably having been the most important feature of that agreement as far as the belligerents themselves were concerned. 110 Surprisingly enough, we find that the parties still considered it essential to specify a waiver of ransom in the armistice agreement concluded in 1814 after Napoleon's first downfall. However, the importance of the latter armistice from our point of view is twofold: It provided that all prisoners of war should be "immediately sent back to their respective countries"; and it provided for the appointment of commissioners by each side "in order to carry this general liberation into eff"ect."l11 In the Armistice of Malmoe it was agreed that all prisoners of war would be "set free"; and a supplementary agreement stated where they would be taken for "delivery to their officers.,,112 Prior to the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the Conventions in Geneva in 1949 most writers on the subject took the position that the final answer to the question of the return of prisoners of war was for the treaty of peace, not for the armistice.
1l7 They reasoned that to act otherwise would be to give an unwarranted advantage to the side which had lost the greater number of soldiers to the enemy and a corresponding disadvantage to the side which had been successful in capturing the larger number of prisoners of war. It was suggested that it would be appropriate to reach a separate agreement, after the armistice had been signed, under which prisoners would be exchanged in equal numbers and correspondin f Edes, thus avoiding any change in the relative positions of the belligerents. 1 This is the procedure normally followed in cartels for the exchange of prisoners of war.
1l9 While there is much to be said for this position, it is not fully supported by history and, in the light of the quoted provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention, it is not in conformity with the requirements of an international convention which has been so widely accepted as already to be considered as constituting universal internationallaw. l20 This is not to say that the basic reason for the theory expressed above is not a valid one. When prisoners of war are held by the two belligerent sides in such disproportionate numbers as was the case in Korea, there is no question but that total release and repatriation considerably changes the balance between the two sides, even where there is a provision, as there is in the Korean Armistice Agreement, against the employment in subsequent acts of war of prisoners of
war re ease an repatnate pursuant to an amusnce agreement. The Renville Truce Agreement (which, it will be recalled, was signed on January 17, 1948, prior to the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Convention and prior even to the Stockholm Conference where the working draft of the subsequent prisoner of war convention was prepared) contains the following significant provision:
To accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party and to commence discussions with a view of the most rapid and convenient implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the number of prisoners held by either party.122
The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement provided for an immediate exchange of all prisoners of war. 123 The provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement with regard to prisoners of war are too well known to require repetition here. 124 Article 21 of the Agreement for the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam f:rovided generally for the "liberation and repatriation of all prisoners of war." 1 5 In elaborating on that provision the agreement states that prisoners of war will be "surrendered" to the other side-which would seem to indicate acceptance of the principle of "forcible repatriation." However, the agreement further provides that the side to which they have been surrendered will assist them in proceeding to the zone of their choice-which would seem to indicate a right of self-determination by the individual. It is extremely doubtful that any of these unfortunates were among the horde of refugees who moved from the Communist to the non-Communist zone.
126
The omission of the India-Pakistan Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement from the above discussion was not inadvertent. For some reason the United Nations Commission resolution which became the Agreement made no mention of this subject; and apparently neither of the parties ever suggested that it be included.
G. Consultative Machinery
Provisions in an armistice agreement for the establishment of commissions with various functions have a long history. Under the circumstances, it is somewhat strange to find that the subject had not been mentioned in the literature on the subject prior to the inclusion of a provision with regard thereto in The Law of Land Warfare. That provision reads as follows:
Consultative machinery. It is generally desirable to provide for the establishment of a commission, composed of representatives of the opposing forces, to supervise the implementation of the armistice agreement. Additional commissions, composed of representatives of the belligerents or of neutral powers or both, may be constituted to deal with such matters as the repatriation of prisoners of war. 127
The armistice proposed by the ambassadors of France and Great Britain in 1608 has already been mentioned in another connection. 128 That document also contained a provision to the effect that in the event the parties were unable to agree concerning the continued occupation of certain villages and hamlets, some "notable persons" would be selected to decide the question. This provision
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was among those which the parties omitted from the Truce of Antwerp. However, the Truce ofRatisbonne established a commission to delimit frontiers so that in the future there may be no dispute to the prejudice of the truce herein agree upon. The said Conunissioners shall work together to the end that if either party fails to make the promised restitutions, or to comply with any provision of his . ill b . 1 hi 129 t agreement, It w e entlre y s own act.
Similarly, the 1809 Vienna agreement provided for commissioners to be named by both sides for the purpose of supervising the execution of the agreement. It is believed that on the basis of the foregoing consistent experience of recent years it may be assumed that the device of commissions made up of members of the belligerent forces and commissions made up of representatives of neutral nations, to which is assigned the mission of implementing and of supervising the implementation of the provisions of an armistice agreement, has become an accepted feature of such agreements.
H. Political
It has already been pointed out that one of the characteristics of an armistice . h . . li . al d . 11 mili' I 137 Th 1S t at 1t may contam po ac an econonuc, as we as tary, causes. e Law of Land Warfare enumerates a number of categories of such clauses which may be contained in an armistice, including disposition of aircraft and shipping; co-operation in the punishment of war crimes; restitution of captured or looted property; shipping, communications facilities and public utilities; civil administration; displaced persons; and the dissolution of organizations which may subvert public order.
138 It is obvious that a number of these subjects would only be appropriate in an armistice such as most of those which were concluded during or at the end of the two world wars where the victors were dictating terms to the vanquished. Some, such as those relating to displaced persons, movement of civilians, commercial intercourse, etc., have already been discussed. Generally speaking, it may be stated that the scope of this type of provision is limited only by the ability of the belligerents to reach agreement with regard thereto. Numerous examples of such provisions may be found in the armistice agreements of the past decade which we have been examining h . 139 erem.
I. Violations
The question of denunciations has already been discussed in connection with armistice agreements of indefinite duration.
140 Now it is appropriate to examine the problem of violations of an armistice agreement and denunciations in connection therewith. In his Instructions, Lieber stated that "if either party violates any express condition, the armistice may be declared null and void by the other.,,141 Article 51 of the Declaration of Brussels also included a statement to the effect that a violation of an armistice gave the other party the right to terminate it ("Ie denoncer,,).142 It will be noted that under either of these rules a belligerent had the right to denounce an armistice for a violation of even a minor condition. An attempt was made to remedy this situation by Article 40 of both of the Hague Regulations which authorized a denunciation for a "serious violation," with the additional proviso that in cases of "urgency" the violation might warrant the recommencing of hostilities immediately.143 Clearly, the failure to define the term "serious violation" and the indefiniteness of the term "urgency" left a great deal to the discretion of the aggrieved party.144 After analyzing the applicable international conventions and the writers on the subject, one eminent author arrives at this conclusion:
... Three rules may be formulated from this-(l) violations which are not serious do not even give a right to denounce an armistice; (2) serious violations empower the other party to denounce the armistice, but not, as a rule, to recommence hostilities at once without giving notice; (3) only in case of urgency is a party justified in recommencing hostilities without notice. 145 
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Parties nego1latmg amus1lce agreements have apparendy been loathe to include any reference therein with regard to the possibility of denunciation for violation, perhaps because they have preferred to rely on the rather vague rule of international law. 146 It is suggested that in these days of extremely detailed agreements it might be well to consider the advisability of specifying in the agreement which of its provisions are considered by the parties to be of such importance that a violation would be considered either "serious" or "urgent."
One of the important problems with regard to violations is that of the violation of a provision of an armistice by an individual acting independendy. Grotius stated that "private acts do not break a truce unless in addition there is a public act, that is, through command or approval.
147 This is the basic tenor of Article 52 of the Declaration of Brussels and Article 41 of both of the Hague Regulations, all of which, in substance, provide that a violation by a private act only entides the aggrieved side to demand that the individual offender be punished and, in an appropriate case, to demand compensation for damages. 148
The Rules of Land Warfare defined the term "private individuals" as excluding members of the armed forces. 149 The Law of Land Warfare reverses that position, stating that in the sense of Article 41 of the 1907 Hague Regulations a private individual is any person, including a member of the armed forces, who acts on his own responsibility. 150 It is believed that the Hague Regulation intended, like Grotius, to distinguish between official and unofficial acts, and that the definition appearing in the later manual is fully consonant with that distinction: The Law of Land Warfare states further that violations by individuals do not justify denunciation unless they are proved to have been committed with the knowledge and consent of their government or commander-and that consent may be inferred from a persistent failure to punish the offenders. 151
As far back as the Armistice ofUlm in 1647 we find a provision to the effect that officers of either side who violated any provision of the armistice agreement would be severely punished.
152 Paragraph 13e of the Korean Armistice Agreement requires the commanders of the two sides to "insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished"; and Article 22 of the Viet-Nam Agreement is identical, except for minor differences which probably resulted during the course of translating from English to French and then back into English. 153 It can logically be assumed that if the parties provide for the punishment of individual violators, they do not contemplate that such violations constitute a basis for denunciation. The emergence of the guerrilla or partisan as a potent force in modem warfare has emphasized this problem. Irregular forces are frequendy difficult to control; but it is not unusual to find them specifically included, with the regular forces, within the restrictions contained in the annistice.
154 While this procedure is obviously appropriate, their frequent disregard of the orders of the commander of the organized military forces, who is responsible for insuring compliance with the provisions of the annistice, can become an acute problem insofar as violations f h .. d 155 o t e arnust:J.ce are conceme .
J. Naval
Authorities wnt:J.ng on the war conventions have, with rare exception, devoted little more than a sentence or two to the subject of the effect ofa general . . al
Th h . all . . h arnust:J.ce on nav wanare. ey are, owever, pract:J.c y unammous WIt regard to the few rules which they do enunciate.
Naturally, a general annistice would impliedly include a prohibition against a naval bombardment or a naval battle, inasmuch as every general annistice includes a complete suspension of active hostilities. However, the problem is more difficult when the question involved is the maintenance of a naval blockade with its concomitant factors such as the right of visit and search, control over neutral vessels, seizure of contraband, taking of prizes, etc.
One of the more recent works on this subject states:
... During a general annistice, belligerents probably also have the right to capture vessels belonging to the enemy and to stop and visit neutral ships as well as to prevent them from breaking a blockade and from carrying contraband, unless otherwise agreed upon. The question is not, however, settled and the taking of . .
pnze 10 partIc ar may e COOSl ere as a os e act.
As a practical matter, it is difficult to see how a belligerent who continues the maintenance of a blockade during an annistice can avoid committing hostile acts. However, most writers are far more positive than the above quotation would indicate concerning the right of a belligerent to continue during a general annistice a naval blockade which had been previously established and concerning which the annistice agreement makes no provision. 158 There is some indication that modem thinking in this direction is premised on the equally modem doctrine which pennits a naval blockade even in time of peace-the so-called "pacific blockade.,, 159 The limitation with regard to prizes noted above is undoubtedly based upon the statement made by one writer to the effect that such an act "is irreconcilable with a state of suspension of hostilities.,, 160 It is apparent that the failure, in an appropriate case, to include within an armistice a clear provision with regard to naval blockade, and naval warfare generally, can be the cause of serious difficulties and, perhaps, even of the resumption of hostilities. 161 Let us review some of the annistice agreements in which an attempt has been made to cover the subject and weigh the sufficiency or insufficIency of the provisions drafted for that purpose. The Truce of Antwerp (Spain-United Provinces) stated that "all acts of hostility of all nature on sea and on land shall cease.,,162 Such a clause would prohibit a pitched battle at sea or a naval bombardment of an enemy shore-but would it prohibit a blockade? The Armistice of Paris which followed Napoleon's abdication in 1814 was more specific. 163 It provided that the blockade of France would be lifted and that all prizes taken after various dates (which allowed for the time necessary for the news to reach different areas) would be restored. No difficulties should arise under such an armistice; nor under the somewhat similar provisions of the Armistice of Malmoe, which even went so far as to require the return of prizes legitimately taken and to provide for indemnification if prizes and their cargoes could not be returned in kind.
164
The Armistice of Versailles of1871 (France-Germany) created a naval line of demarcation and provided for the restoration of all captures made after the conclusion of the armistice and before its notification. 165 Again, this would seem to meet the requirements of precision and completeness essential to prevent disputes.
The Armistice ofShimonoseki Gap an-China) adopted the opposite approach, specifically authorizing the seizure of any military sea movements. 166 While this is, of course, entirely ,vithin the power of the parties, some act pursuant thereto may cause such a public reaction as to practically compel a government to resume hostilities-and, also, a government which is looking for an excuse to do so can avail itself of an incident thereunder as a basis for the resumption of hostilities.
Neither the two original armistice agreements entered into on May 19, 1897 (Bpirus), and May 20, 1897 (Thessaly), in the Greco-Turkish War of that period, nor the amended agreements reached on June 3, contained any provisions relating to the naval situation.
167 On June 4 a supplementary agreement was concluded which lifted the Greek blockade, but prohibited Turkey from reinforcing her armies in Greece or bringing in any munitions, limiting her to revictualing her troops hvice a week through designated Greek ports. These, and certain other naval provisions of the supplementary agreement were so indefinite as to be calculated to encourage disputes-which they did. It has already been noted that the Protocol of Portsmouth (Russia-Japan) prohibited bombardment of enemy territory by naval forces and that the subsequent "Naval Protocol of Armistice" established a boundary line between the hvo fleets. 168 The Protocol of Portsmouth also provided that "maritime captures will not be suspended by the armistice." It is to be assumed that the Japanese were following the precedent which they had established in the Armistice of Shimonoseki.
Levie on the Law of War
The early post-World War II annistice agreements tended to follow the irregular pattern indicated above. The Renville Truce Agreement contains no reference to naval warfare or the sea-a strange situation for an armistice relating to an island area.
169 The Israeli-Lebanese General Annistice Agreement provided that "a general annistice between the anned forces of the two parties-land, sea and air-is hereby established" and that "no element of the land, sea or air military or para- This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea. 172 This is probably one of the most complete naval provisions ever included in an annistice agreement. However, the general descriptive statement concerning this annistice is qualified in view of the fact that in negotiating it an attempt to reach an agreement on the extent of the territorial waters was unsuccessful because the United Nations Command proposed the traditional three-mile limit, the Communists insisted on the twelve-mile limit, and the Republic of Korea had established the arbitrary "Rhee Line" which extends anywhere from 60 to 200 miles from shore. According to unofficial accounts the United Nations Command has voluntarily imposed a twelve-mile limit on its personnel in order to avoid incidents. However, this has not been entirely successful.
Finally, the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam is almost, though not quite, as complete as the Korean Annistice Agreement. Article 24 provides that the agreement applies to all of the anned forces of either party and states that such anned forces "shall commit no act and undertake no operation against the other party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in Viet_Nam.,,173 It also defines the territory of a party as including "territorial waters." France supports the three-mile definition of territorial waters and it is to be assumed that the state ofViet-Nam does likewise. It is equally to be assumed that the Viet-Minh will subscribe to the twelve-mile limit of territorial waters supported by the U.S.S.R. Accordingly, here, too, there is a possibility of dispute.
The foregoing discussion has, it is believed, indicated the necessity of including in an annistice agreement specific and precise provisions with regard to naval warfare, blockades, etc. It should also have indicated that progress in the right direction has been made in recent years and that care on the part of the negotiators of future annistice agreements can quickly and simply eliminate the naval problem as a source of irritation during the often uneasy period of armistice.
IV. Conclusion
The general annistice is a living, dynamic war convention which, despite centuries of use, is still continuing in each decade to expand its scope and to increase the importance of its position among the agreements concerning the non-hostile relations of belligerents. The elaborate annistice agreements of recent years have, in effect, rendered the preliminaries of peace obsolete. It is not inconceivable that the formal treaty of peace will suffer the same fate and that wars \vill one day end at the annistice (apparendy in the latter's 5th edition) to the effect that "it is universally agreed that during an armistice a belligerent may do in the actual theatre of war only such things as the enemy could not have prevented him from doing at the moment when actual hostilities ceased"; and that, perhaps as a salutary effect ofSpaight's criticism, the next edition of Lawrence's work (the 6th), published in 1915, four years after Spaight's book appeared, stated (at p. 566): "There is a controversy whether during an armistice a belligerent may do, in the actual theatre of war, only such things as the enemy could not have prevented him from doing at the moment when active hostilities ceased, or whether he may do whatever is not forbidden expressly, except, of course, attack the enemy or advance further into his territory. The weight of authority is in favor of the former alternative; but the weight of reasoning seems on the side of the latter, which has the decisive support of recent practices." The latest (1927) edition of Lawrence is consistent with its immediate predecessor (p. 558). 40. Several hundred years before the birth of Christ the famous Philip of Macedon took advantage of a "truce" (we would call it a suspension of arms), which he had requested for the purpose of burying his dead, and withdrew to a more advantageous positipn. Gentili (op. at. ii, XIII, 313) says "Philip did wrong"; Grotius (op. at. iii, XXI, VII) maintains that "it is not inconsistent with a truce to withdraw with the army inland as we read in Livy that Philip did"; Vattel (op. at. iii, XVI, 250) also sees no bad faith in such an act, though waming that it gives the enemy the right to renew the attack despite the suspension of hostilities; Winthrop (op. at. 787) concurs in Gentili's position; while Maurice (op. at. 32) points out that in October, 1918, the British and French felt it necessary to call President Wilson's attention to the fact that the mere evacuation of occupied territory by the Germans (which had been suggested as a provision of the armistice which was then under discussion) would not suffice, inasmuch as the enemy would then have the opportunity, among other things, of "retiring without loss on to new positions which he would have time to choose and fortify"-clear acceptance of the validity of Phillip's act.
41. The last reported incidents involving this problem occurred during the latter half of the 19th century. They clearly indicate that, as a matter of practice, belligerents have frequendy taken actions during an armistice which were not specifically forbidden and which the enemy could have prevented at the moment when actual hostilities ceased. One of these incidents occurred during the Seven Weeks' War between Prussia and Austria. Mter the Annistice ofNikolsburg had been signed Guly 26, 1866), Prince Frederick Charles, the Prussian commander, massed his troops in such a manner as to facilitate an attack on Pressburg, should the negotiations for peace fail, an action which the Austrians could, at least, have rendered difficult. This action brought no protest from the Austrians-and the Treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866) brought the war to an end. Similarly, after the Annistice of Adrianople had been signed Gan. 31, 1878), bringing to a halt hostilities between the Russians and the Turks, the Russian commander, General Todeben, ordered his troops to erect a number of high observation posts from which a full view of the Turkish entrenchments could be obtained, an act which the Russians certainly could not have accomplished prior to the cessation of hostilities. The Turkish commander demanded that they be removed and threatened to open fire on them if this was not done. General Todeben refused to comply with this demand and complained to the Turkish Government which overruled its military commander and never questioned the right of the Russians to do as they had done. And again, during the Boer War, after the signing of the Armistice ofTugela Heights (Feb. 25, 1900), British artillery was moved to new positions and the British took other actions which the Boers had been in a position to prevent at the time the armistice was signed. All this was apparendy done with no protest on the part of the Boers.
42 43. For an example of this practice, see sub-pars. 13c and 13d of the Korean Annistice Agreement. The three Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina have many restrictive provisions identical \vith, or closely parallel to, those contained in the Korean Annistice Agreement. They also have additional provisions in this regard, such as those relating to "foreign troops," "military bases," and "military alliances."
44. See discussion above. 45. A number of the armistice agreements to which reference will be made were studied in somewhat esoteric documents which were approximately contemporaneous with the particular armistice itself. These documents, many of which are probably unique, are located in the Library of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Where this is so it will be indicated by a footnote stating "I.CJ. Library."
46. Pars. 487-488, The Law of Land Warfare (note 12 above). 47. See discussion above.
